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The United States and Poland part II Piotr Wandycz, Yale University In the last decades of the nineteenth century the "Polish Question" largely disappeared from the agenda of international politics. In the United States references to Poland and the Poles remained, however, as part of political discourse. In 1908 President Taft described Poland's partitions as "historical fact lamented by nearly every heart".
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In 1914 The Nation commented that the partition "was long the favorite example for American orators as a great international crime". But, a few years earlier A History of the American People referred disparagingly to the waves of Polish and other immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe by calling them "men of the meaner sort" who lacked skill, energy or "initiative of quick intelligence". Few people anticipated that the author would shortly become "Poland's inspired protector" and a "foster father of a chiefless land", to cite the somewhat flowery language of Ignacy Paderewski. We are speaking here, naturally, of President Woodrow Wilson. Historians keep wondering why Wilson became the champion of Poland and proclaimed the need for its independence in the Peace without Victory speech of 1917 and the much more famous Fourteen Points. Was Wilson's championing due to the influence of Paderewski and Colonel House? Did the Polish American vote play a role here? Personally, I tend to agree with the view that Paderewski's contribution apart, the Polish case fitted well into Wilson's concept of national self-determination. The way in which it was originally presented - in terms of relief for the stricken land - gained a good deal of sympathy of the American people. Time does not permit a real analysis, but the President's stand proved very important for the rebirth of the Polish state. The Wilson Square in Warsaw, for one, and the recently reconstructed statue of Colonel House testify to Polish gratitude. And yet, during the interwar years American support for and interest in Poland dwindled to a minimum. The first Polish representative in Washington, Franciszek Pulaski, rightly remarked that "Poland is treated rather as a romantic cause that lends itself to humanitarian actions than as a political issue". Poland, however, was not a charity case. It had ambition and will to power. Poland's search for security and its war with the Bolsheviks were deemed imperialistic - minor anti-Jewish excesses and quarrels with neighbours earned it bitter criticism. Wartime sympathy for Poland began to wane. True, American capital occupied an important place in the country, and the often set forth theories that it operated to the advantage of the Germans against the Poles, are largely unfounded. True, American help in the stabilization loan overcame German opposition. Hoover's program of aid was of tremendous assistance. There was some sympathy for Pilsudski. But, at the same time the policy of the United States tinged by isolationism - a much misunderstood term - favoured peaceful revision in Europe to ensure peace and greater stability. In that sense Warsaw had cause to worry. The Second World War was to bring the "Polish Question" once again into the international limelight. The war years, however, were to show all the shadows of a relationship between a great power, the de facto leader of the anti-Axis coalition and Poland - an occupied country divided between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia - whose inhabitants lived under a regime of terror and whose government in exile commanded only a relatively small number of troops, airmen and sailors, however well and tenaciously they fought on all fronts. The uneven character of the relationship was all too obvious. I once entitled an article on this subject Inspiration or Trouble-maker? referring to President Roosevelt's remarks about Poland made before the United States entered the war and at the Yalta Conference. At the early stage Roosevelt extolled the Polish underground and its heroic fight against the German occupiers, as part of his campaign to overcome isolationism and educate American public opinion to the Nazi danger. By the time of Yalta the Polish issue became for him an awkward problem complicating the relations with Moscow. Actually, the President had little genuine concern for Poland. His vision of the postwar world was based on the cooperation of the great powers - the Four Policemen idea - to which all others were to adjust. In Roosevelt's utterances Wilsonian ideals mingled with Realpolitik, and in his dealings with foreign statesmen the proverbial charm served often as substitute for his limited diplomatic experience. The Poles found themselves in the unique position of having in fact two enemies: Nazi Germany, against which they fought physically, and Soviet Russia which was one of the pillars of the Allied coalition and which aimed at subordinating Poland to its will. The only chance of success which Polish diplomacy had was to convince Great Britain and particularly the United States that victory over Germany would be incomplete if Soviet Russia were to rule over half of Europe. But, such arguments fell on deaf ears. Besides, the West badly needed Soviet cooperation to win the war and was not going to endanger it by taking Poland's part. General Sikorski's efforts, supported by the British, to work for a postwar regional organization of East Central Europe which could better resist Russian encroachments, met with polite phrases in Washington. In reality, Roosevelt felt that it was up to the great powers to decide "what Poland should be", and he was not going to "bargain with Poland or the other small states". In fact, he became increasingly annoyed with the Poles - hence the remark recorded by Churchill that Poland "has been a source of trouble for over five hundred years". Why five hundred years, I am not quite sure. Churchill's formula for resolving the "Polish Question" was based on the assumption that if the Polish government in London made territorial concessions to Soviet Russia it could gain in exchange internal freedom for Poland. Washington seemed to believe the opposite. Relegating the border question to the future, largely in the belief that events would take care of it, the United States wished for the Poles to become "friendly" to the Kremlin ruler. Roosevelt termed the Polish reaction over Katyn "stupid", and although Soviet behaviour at the time of the Warsaw Uprising was deemed reprehensible - there was no clear reaction from Washington. Here, I would tend to agree with Adam Ulam's view that the primary defect in the American diplomacy was "the failure to make itself respected". The Polish case "demonstrated to Stalin that America was unsure about her policies and ignorant of the vast material and moral assets of which she disposed to the Soviet Union". Let me turn now to a very brief summary of American relations with Poland during the second half of the twentieth century. It is obvious that after World War II the "Polish Question" became part of a larger problem: that of the division of Europe and of the Cold War. Poland occupied a more visible place within that context than other so-called satellites at certain specific times, especially in the late 1940s, in 1956, 1980/81, and as communism collapsed in 1989. The transition period of 1945/48 exposed the bankruptcy of an important assumption of the American diplomacy, namely that the Soviet Bloc would be an open sphere flow of economic goods and ideas. The provisions about free and unfettered elections proved illusory, and we can only debate whether the Yalta Accords were violated or whether they were so flexible that they could be stretched by the Soviet Union all the way without being technically broken. The United States came to adopt the Containment policy, which seemed to imply disinterest in East Central Europe, Poland included. The "rape" of the latter, to use Mikolajczyk's term, or its "betrayal" to use that of Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, played an important role (together with the 1948 coup in Prague) in the formulation of the Republican's policy of Liberation. Was the latter only a myth while Containment under different forms continued to operate in all those years? Liberation was certainly not a policy aiming at freeing East Central Europe by force. It suffered from an ambivalence - especially after the Stalin-Tito break - whether liberation meant freeing a country from communism or from its dependence on the Soviet Union. The Doctrine of Liberation never recovered from the 1956 crisis. John Foster Dulles had publicly "ruled out the use of United States armed forces to help Poland regain her freedom". The Hungarian freedom fighters faced Soviet tanks alone. Yet, one could argue that in Poland's case Gomulka's rise to power offered an example of a limited "self-liberation" process which was to be sustained by American economic aid. John Kennedy's dictum that this aid was "too little and too late" was based on the belief, shared by many, that a bold American initiative could have decisively affected an evolution toward freedom and democracy. From a historical perspective this seems an unfounded hope. Such aid as was given was substantial and by and large timely. The same was true for the opening of travel, particularly academic exchanges between the United States and Poland. If the Liberation rhetoric sounded rather hollow it would be a mistake to underestimate its main byproduct, namely the propagandistic activities and especially Radio Free Europe. Its impact on Poland was considerable both before and after the Polish October 1956. The Radio operating from Munich had to stay clear, however, of an important issue, namely the German-Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line. This postwar border which involved the expulsion of millions of Germans was to be officially recognized at a future peace conference with Germany. In the meantime the United States was determined to avoid recognition because of the need of cooperation with Germany. There the expellees from Poland acted as pressure groups. This situation allowed the Polish communist regime to represent the USSR as the sole guarantor of the Oder-Neisse border and denounce German revisionists and their protectors in Washington. It was not until the collapse of communism that final recognition, largely due to the United States, accompanied the accords on the reunification of Germany. The decades stretching from the late 1950s to the late 1970s witnessed several phases distinguished by such names as Peaceful Engagement, Bridge Building, Detente. The continuing American aid was periodically questioned by the Congress wishing to see political results follow economic largesse. This created problems for the White House. The election of President Kennedy, his Polish connection and his style in politics elated the Poles and his death caused genuine mourning in Warsaw, yet it is hard to see how he could have promoted more effectively American-Polish relations. Bridge Building under President Johnson emphasized trade, the flow of ideas, visitors and humanitarian aid. Still, by 1968 political overtures and initiatives toward Poland fell more to the Germans and the French. If the Polish March 1968 crisis and Poland's participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia lowered pro-Polish sympathies in the United States, the rise of Gierek in 1970 seemed to offer new hopes for a more constructive relationship. Nixon's visit to Warsaw in May 1972 and Gierek's to America in 1974 were taking place in the aura of East-West Detente. If massive economic investments in Poland temporarily improved living conditions they did not resolve the mounting political crisis. Yet, neither Gorbachev's reforms nor the volatile situation in Poland prepared people for the sudden outburst and the magnitude of Solidarity. In 1980 Poland figured larger in American policy and public opinion than ever before. Lech Walesa came to be admired. Solidarity appeared as ex oriente lux. Threats of Soviet intervention were discussed not only in Washington but in telephone conversations between the White House and the Vatican, conversations held in Polish for the first time in the history of the two institutions. I refer to those between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Pope John Paul II. According to a contemporary wit the Poles needed only a third man, namely in the Kremlin. The American role in the Solidarity crisis was, I think, on the whole positive and imaginative. The American stand may well have prevented an invasion in 1980. One cannot forget the statements of President Reagan and the program Let Poland be Poland. The subsequent policy of "stick and carrot" as carried out by Ambassador John Davies helped to prepare the ground for the Round Table talks and the "negotiated revolution". The end of the Cold War imposed huge responsibilities on the United States. It became imperative to have a vision and to formulate a program for a New World Order - a tremendous task which is not yet completed. There are people who miss the apparent stability and the simplicity of a bipolar system forgetting its iniquities. Poland came to occupy a larger place than before in American diplomacy. We are witnessing an "americanization" of Poland in many fields which means that the country begins to share all the current problems of the West. The new great issue facing American foreign policy
which is bound to affect greatly American-Polish relations is the expansion
of NATO. There is no unanimity of views in this country over that issue
while almost 90% Poles desire to join NATO. I am cautiously hopeful
about the final outcome, just as I am optimistic about the future of
American-Polish relations in which American Polonia has traditionally
played an important and positive role. These relations have always been
friendly, but I would wish them to become "normal" interstate
relations, just as many Poles desire their country to be neither an
inspiration nor a martyr nor a source of trouble, but a normal European
country remaining true to its old heritage while building a better future. • Professor Piotr Wandycz, a historian at the Yale University, gave this speech on May 2, 1997 at the Library of Congress. The occasion was the opening of an exhibit Emblem of Good Will, organized by the staff at US Library of Congress in conjunction with the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, and sponsored by the Federation of Polish Americans. Additional support for the exhibit came from AMPLICO Life, the US-Europe-Poland Action Commission, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Last modified January 29, 2006 9:48 PM |
