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MARSHAL ŚMIGŁY-RYDZ IN EXILE Stanley S. Seidner The author would like to express his special gratitude for the assistance rendered by the late Prof. Alexander Korczynski. Copyright © 1977 The Polish Review |
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[the contents of any particular reference in the text of this article may be accessed by 'clicking' on the number of that reference provided in square brackets] Exile and Beyond During the early morning hours of September 18, 1939, Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, the commander-in-chief of Poland's armed forces, crossed the Czeremosz bridge onto Rumanian territory and began a two-year period of exile. For seventeen days, the Marshal contained the greater part of the Wehrmacht in anticipation of a promised major French offensive which never materialized. Suffering from declining health and facing the prospect of incessant criticism, Rydz began the final journey which eventually returned him to his native land. With the Soviet invasion of its eastern provinces the day before, Poland was now decisively defeated. The Marshal could expect less help from England and France against the U.S.S.R. than he had anticipated against Germany. Under no condition did the Western Powers desire the additional burden of war with the Soviet Union. The abandonment by the West and the increasingly awesome responsibilities of command contributed towards a deterioration of health, which the Marshal kept from his subordinates. Although he conveyed an outward picture of calm and serenity, few knew of Rydz's mounting physical suffering from a defective heart [1]. The chief of Poland's intelligence service, then Col. Jozef Smolenski, was one of those who appeared unaware of this, when he related:
The ramifications of the Soviet invasion became a key issue during an afternoon conference at Kolomyja on September 17 between Rydz, Prime Minister Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, and Foreign Minister, Jozef Beck. The three agreed that the Government and High Command should force their way southward [3]. A second afternoon conference at Kuty, attended by President Ignacy Moscicki, Rydz, Skladkowski and Beck, resulted in the collective decision to cross the Rumanian frontier [4]. Upon fulfilling his obligations by providing the disposition of various Polish units, the Marshal planned to stay and fight, much to distress of Skladkowski, among others. It was with apparent difficulty that the cumulative effect of their arguments presented to Rydz caused a change of mind. Beck had already indicated that King Carol offered the Polish President and the Government the droit de passage through Rumanian territory, and even the rejected Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski offered his services toward the reinstatement of a Polish army on French soil [5]. The political consideration involving the possibility of Rydz's capture or death, and the necessities governing the reestablishment of Poland's army in France, probably outweighed his desire for an heroic last stand [6]. A short time later, on Rumanian territory, Rydz claimed:
Nevertheless, a number of Rydz's critics expected the Marshal to return to besieged Warsaw. They claimed that when defense no longer proved feasible, Rydz could then "possibly take an airplane and escape". Consequently, critics like the Socialist leader Adam Ciolkosz declared that Rydz had "left a bad memory" [8]. For the moment, the combined Soviet and German advances obscured such bitter sentiments while the leaders of the Second Republic pondered their final decisions before exile. The capture by the Soviet forces of Sniatyn, only forty kilometers from the Polish High Command headquarters at Kosow, led to the Marshal's final decision to evacuate [9]. After requesting through Skladkowski that the President and Government members immediately cross the border, the Marshal left for the frontier bridge on the Czeremosz River. Upon leaving Polish territory, the Marshal issued an order which failed to reach a large number of Poland's engaged units.
Rydz stated,
The events following the withdrawal portended further disappointment and tragedy for the Marshal, who expected Rumania to extend its pledge of passage through its territory to the eventual destination of France. Already, Rumania experienced increased pressure from Berlin through September. In view of the fate which befell Poland, Bucharest officials pondered the prospects of occupation and partition upon antagonizing the Reich. Facing in addition the belligerence of Hungary, Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R., arising from territorial questions, Rumania decided against fulfilling its minimum obligation as Poland's ally [11]. As commander-in-chief of Poland's armed forces, Rydz posed the exception to any professed offers of transit, in view of the Hague Convention of 1907, which prohibited the droit de passage for military personnel. The prohibition weighed heavily upon the Marshal, who was under the impression that Beck's indications extended also to military personnel. These assurances apparently had influenced Rydz to reverse his decision of remaining behind in Poland. The interpretation of the Rumanian promise resulted in at least one "sharp exchange of opinion" between Rydz and Beck at their temporary site of accommodation, the bishop's palace at Cernauti [12]. Preferring a modification of its promise to open hostilities, Rumania's hospitality took the form of confining Rydz to Craiova in southern Rumania, Moscicki to Bicaz and other members of the regime to other distant localities such as Slanic and Baile Herculane [13]. During this period, Poland’s embassies in Paris and London pressed the Western Powers to use their influence to gain a reversal of Rumania's position. An important obstacle to such pleas developed when Poland's pre-war opposition centers openly blamed Rydz and other leaders for their nation's defeat [14]. While Rydz fought in Poland, opposition leaders met in Lwow on September 11 and discussed, among other things, the institution of a political triumvirate, made up of generals Sikorski, Sosnkowski and Haller. Although Sikorski declined the proposition, he would conduct negotiations with French military and political representatives with the apparent aim of replacing Poland's ruling leaders [15]. Following talks with French ambassador, Léon Noël, generals Félix Joseph Musse and Louis Faury, Sikorski readily seemed to accept the probability of Rydz's confinement. Already in May of 1939, Sikorski maintained separate contact with Noël and other officials [16]. Even as he repeatedly professed loyalty and the desire to serve the Marshal, Sikorski's ambitions visibly surfaced as a partial result of approaches from discontented Polish political and military personalities [17]. Sikorski appeared to gain willing converts towards his future acquisition of power. Poland's military attaché to Bucharest, Lt.-Col. Tadeusz Zakrzewski, for example, reaffirmed his verbal allegiance to the Marshal, but subsequently placed himself, as did others, at Sikorski's disposition. The Polish ambassador to London, Count Edward Raczynski, believed that his brother Roger, who served as ambassador to Bucharest, "played a considerable part in the change of regime". Roger Raczynski visited Moscicki at Bicaz and suggested that the President resign his office after appointing a replacement for Rydz as commander-in-chief. Here Noël reportedly expressed the desirability of a change "both of regime and of personalities" [18]. Faury similarly had intended to tell Rydz on September 19 that Sikorski should organize Poland's army in France. If Paris had once desired Beck's removal as Poland's foreign minister, to the point of attempted blackmail, now various French political circles welcomed a complete change of the Polish government [19]. Such sentiments crystallized in opposition to one of Rydz's old comrades-in-arms, Gen. Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, who was designated by Moscicki as the presidential successor. Dlugoszowski's designation raised a storm of controversy from Poland's exiled opposition elements who desired to terminate what they considered the Pilsudski succession. Interference with Poland's constitutional prerogatives confirmed the convictions of more than one Polish diplomat that France had acted in cooperation with opposition elements under Sikorski's leadership [20]. Coinciding with the succession crisis, a further obstacle to the transfer of Poland's military and political authorities occurred with the assassination of Rumania's prime minister, Armand Calinescu on September 22 by the pro-German extremist Iron Guard organization. Rumanian press editorials cited Britain's failure to effect any deviation regarding Calinescu's neutrality policy, "thus blocking the British scheme to transport Rydz-Smigly and the Polish soldiers ... [21]. Following Moscicki's resignation on the night of September 29-30 in favor of Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, the former governor of Pomorze, no difficulty was now "apprehended for the free exit of everyone of the former government". This, however, failed to apply "in the case of Marshal Smigly-Rydz who would remain interned" [22]. In a conversation with the Marshal, Faury reportedly indicated that the possible transfer of Polish troops from Rumania depended upon Rydz's confinement. Any attempt by the Marshal to escape would supposedly jeopardize these movements [23]. Although Rydz retained the position of commander-in-chief, Sikorski was officially placed on September 28 at the head of Poland's army in France. The decision ran counter to the Marshal's previous designation in agreement with Paris of Gen. Jerzy Ferek-Bleszynski to lead future Polish formations on French soil. The reported "bitterness and outrage" in the exiled units over Rydz's withdrawal to Rumania, as well as Sikorski's prominent status in France's opinion contributed towards the decision [24]. Two days before Sikorski's appointment, the Marshal managed to transfer final orders to Gen. Juliusz Rommel, who commanded Warsaw's beleaguered garrison, to defend Poland's capital as long as ammunition and provisions permitted, and to establish a clandestine network of army cells. Rydz's order giving Maj. Edmund Galinat "command and direction" of the future underground organization was "tragically illustrative", to Rommel, "of the prevailing relations in our High Command" [25]. Perhaps the effects of the emerging malevolent sentiments in concert with the uncertainty of his own position impelled the Marshal to write to Rommel that:
The defense of the Marshal's flight and his order directing Polish units to cross the Rumanian and Hungarian frontiers was developed during early October by such supporters as Col. Zygmunt Wenda, the former controversial chief-of-staff of the Oboz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (O.Z.N. - Camp of National Unity), who shared a similar exile. According to Wenda, some 45,000 Polish citizens arrived in Rumania by this time, while an additional 50,000 made their way to Hungary [27]. During the first week of October, Polish authorities in Paris received unconfirmed reports that various foreign representatives in Bucharest urged the Rumanian authorities to arrange for the release of interned Polish troops, "in the event of an attack which now seemed imminent by Russia on Bessarabia" [28]. Contrary to the expectations of the reformed Polish government-in-exile, the Rumanian Minister for Public Order issued a communiqué on October 11, which in effect restricted and concentrated Polish soldiers to specified "camps" and "localities". Three days later, Rumanian authorities transferred Rydz from Craiova to Dragoslavele [29]. While Rydz coped with the daily monotony of confinement at Dragoslavele, Sikorski and other members of Poland's French-based government-in-exile worked towards the total removal of his vestiges of military command. By September 30, Sikorski had already managed to secure both - the command of Poland's army in France and the position of prime minister and minister of war [30]. Under increasing attack for his performance during the September campaign, the Marshal succumbed to a combination of criticisms, pressure from Raczkiewicz, and an immediate hopelessness of escaping internment. On October 27, Rydz submitted his resignation as commander-in-chief of Poland's armed forces. Officially accepting the Marshal's resignation on November 7, Raczkiewicz appointed Sikorski as the new commander-in-chief on the same day. Some members of the government-in-exile, including Sikorski, were said to have wished that Raczkiewicz's written acceptance of Rydz's resignation was "couched in a severer form" [31]. Without any mention of the Marshal's former service, Raczkiewicz accepted Rydz's resignation "on the strength of article 13, paragraph 2, heading D of the law of the Constitution" [32]. The condition of resignation only increased the burden of the Marshal's physical surroundings. This was reflected in the first of several letters written by Rydz to the wife of former president, Ignacy Moscicki:
The Marshal's letters, in many instances, continued to reflect the increased censorship imposed upon the exiled Polish community. "My letters are not reaching anyone", he wrote, "and those sent to me are being held back somewhere" [34]. Rydz's letter to Skladkowski on December 9 emphasized this censorship but also demonstrated his resolve to answer the ever increasing criticism.
Rydz continued to complain,
Already in Paris, the Sikorski-dominated government had rejected the services of Rydz's most ardent supporters and co-workers. The Marshal, himself, embarked on a written defense of his role during the Polish campaign [36]. He claimed to know that "certain Polish political and military opposition groups" negotiated with French agents during the "first days of warfare", to the detriment of the Government. Those Poles, who so conspired, "in the face of God and the Fatherland", would be revealed by history "in their own time" [37]. During this period, which extended through 1940, Rumania found itself subjected to the territorial claims of its immediate neighbors. Rumania appeared to be on the verge of dismemberment as the U.S.S.R. demanded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Bulgaria coveted Southern Dobruja, and Hungary reached for the much-contested Transylvania. Therefore, King Carol decided to renounce the useless Franco-British guarantee in July, 1940, and placed Rumania under German protection. However, in view of the Second Vienna Award which contributed to Carol's overthrow in September, the move ultimately failed to preserve Rumania's territorial integrity. The following month, the Wehrmacht entered Rumania [38]. The occupation created a new situation, which placed Rydz directly into German hands. The Marshal attempted on at least two occasions to escape from his place of internment. The first attempt ended in failure due to insufficient preparation and either "indiscretion or denunciation". Following the arrival of Julian Piasecki at Dragoslavele, the former deputy minister for communication made known his intention of preparing Rydz's escape. The Marshal, as well as Wenda, "welcomed the initiative with great pleasure and gratefulness, which is very characteristic of all people wishing to escape captivity" [39]. Finally, on the evening of December 15-16, 1940, Rydz crawled through a hole which had been cut earlier in the barbed wire fence surrounding his interned residence and fled toward the Hungarian frontier. The Marshal's aide-de-camp, Maj. Jerzy Krzeczkowski, Wenda, and a few others remained behind in order to detract attention from the escape. Piasecki preceded Rydz to Hungary to contact sympathetic Polish émigré elements and to arrange adequate accommodations [40]. Rumanian authorities discovered the Marshal's disappearance at "the earliest, around the 18-19 December, when Wenda was already crossing the frontier". The Rumanian dictator, Gen. Ion Antonescu, who was under apparent German pressure, ordered a nation-wide manhunt. Alerts regarding the possible direction of Rydz flight were transmitted to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary [41]. The day following his escape, the Marshal occupied his first living quarters in Budapest. As a diversionary measure, he addressed a letter to the Rumanian prefect of Kimpolungu to be mailed from Istanbul. This undoubtedly influenced the series of German reports which placed the Marshal in Istanbul and other distant localities [42]. The effect of Rydz's letter was reflected in the German Foreign Office secretary of state, Ernst von Weizsäcker's emphasis upon Turkey's neutrality regarding the sheltering of Rydz as a "Militärperson". The German ambassador to Ankara, Franz von Papen, declared at the high point of these rumors that, "Nach vertraulicher Mitteilung türkischer politischer Polizei hat Rydz-Smigly am 20 Januar Türkei via Irak nach Palästina verlassen" [43]. A few German observers, however, sensed the Marshal's correct geographical location with such speculations as "... Rydz-Smigly mit Juden springen in Budapest eingetruffen sei" [44]. The possibility of immediate exposure caused Rydz to assume the identity of 'Stefan Kwiatkowski, Gymnasium Professor from Lwow'. German authorities would find it difficult to verify the Soviet-occupied origins of the Marshal's adopted pseudonym [45]. After fifteen months of confinement, Rydz finally faced the decision of whether to attempt a passage to the West or to return to Poland. The number of days left to the Marshal for any contemplated service remained questionable, however, considering the strain on his energies and health. Upon arriving in Budapest, Rydz found himself surrounded by a small group of Polish émigrés whose services had also been rejected by Sikorski. Members of this group, which included historian Waclaw Lipinski and Slawa Wenda, the wife of the former O.Z.N. chief-of-staff, immediately began to prepare for Rydz's comfort and security. The news of the Marshal's escape from Rumania and the watchfulness of local officials prompted Piasecki to arrange the Marshal's temporary transfer, on December 21, to a sanatorium in Budapest which was directed by a sympathetic Hungarian doctor. Hungarian army officers reportedly:
Rydz insisted on spending as little time as possible at the sanatorium, and moved once again within the week to a prearranged apartment. During the following months, the Marshal devoted himself largely to painting, writing poetry, and conversing with the few supporters and sympathizers who were aware of his presence in Budapest. Rydz's painting reflected more and more his increasing depression. One watercolor self-portrait shows what appears to be an old man, physically bent and broken in spirit [47]. Piasecki assumed during this period the unofficial position of chief-of-staff to the Marshal. The former deputy minister of communication and O.Z.N. leader "held very many various secret talks with Smigly". By nature a conspirator, Piasecki defended O.Z.N. and stressed the need for clandestine activities. Conversely, the Marshal considered Piasecki's emphasis exaggerated. "As far as O.Z.N.", related the former vice-voivode of Tarnopol, Bazyli Rogowski, "in my talks with Smigly I later became convinced that he himself thought that the entire business wasn't the best thing". Rydz's belief that Poland would have to undertake new forms of government "since fascism would undoubtedly fall", implied the recognition of the extremism, associated with O.Z.N. [48]. However, there appeared little or no indication that the various elements which composed the present-day government-in-exile would readily overlook this recent controversial episode. Conversely, in Rydz's eyes, Sikorski and the 'united' opposition parties represented Poland's worst traditions. As for receiving their 'good will', the Marshal wrote in a last letter to Madam Moscicki:
Nevertheless, the Marshal remained open to suggestions regarding possibilities for his further service. Following Col. Wenda's death in May 1941, Rydz appeared to rely increasingly upon the advice of Piasecki and Lipinski. It is difficult to measure, however, the degree of their influence upon the Marshal's acceptance of the Oboz Polski Walczacej (O.P.W. - Camp of Fighting Poland), as a successor organization to both - O.Z.N. and the original Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (P.O.W. - Polish Military Organization). Although oriented primarily towards the consolidation of 'pilsudczycy' and pro-Pilsudski elements in Poland, the O.P.W. aimed at collaborating with other Polish underground organizations [50]. Following Rydz's, already cited, transmission to Warsaw regarding the formation of an underground network, during the last days of September 1939 Gen. Michal Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski formed the Sluzba Zwyciestwu Polski (S.Z.P. - Service for the Victory of Poland). By November, this organization had evolved into the Zwiazek Walki Zbrojnej (Z.W.Z. - Union for Armed Struggle) under the control of the Polish government-in-exile. However, direction from exile proved unsatisfactory and Col. Stefan 'Grot'-Rowecki received command of the Z.W.Z. Although Soviet authorities arrested Tokarzewski, who served as commander-designate of the Z.W.Z. in eastern Poland, by mid-1940 Rowecki was able to unite various groups into a force of approximately 1 00,000 men [51]. One of the O.P.W.'s tasks, the attempt to form a basic liaison with this and similar, London-oriented organizations, would prove extremely difficult to accomplish. No one in Hungary or Poland possessed the stature of the Marshal as the "most senior 'pilsudczyk'" to lead the newly-conceived O.P.W. Rydz himself had already expressed the desire to return to Poland. The Marshal's depression from confinement and inactivity momentarily gave way to plans, reminiscent of his more youthful conspiratorial days [52]. Preparing for his return to Poland, Rydz assigned tasks to the small group of potential O.P.W. functionaries. As one of the group, Piasecki energetically developed the O.P.W. idea with the Marshal during a short stay in Szantod on Lake Balaton at the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The organization adopted a system of small units of five people each, based on a gradual system and limited inter-group contacts [53]. Four months later, in October, Rydz planned to return with this O.P.W. concept to Poland. As he became "more and more occupied", few saw Rydz "smiling or interested in anything other than his trip to Poland and the work awaiting him there". The date of the Marshal's planned escape changed at least twice, "due to the total isolation" which Rydz and his small circle of friends experienced. The Marshal already rejected an offer from an influential source who was sure that either Count Paul Teleki, the Hungarian premier, or the Regent, Adm. Nicholas Horthy, would gladly provide sanctuary from the Germans [54]. Finally, on October 25, Rydz "was to leave the country which, after all, had given him a few moments of peace and relief" [55]. By a combination of train and taxi, the Marshal reached the Hungarian-Slovak frontier. Accompanied by Rogowski and a guide, Stanislaw Fronczysty, Rydz then crossed the Tatra Mountains on foot and continued later by automobile, as Hungarian and Slovak guards patrolled both sides of the frontier. Upon reaching Tvrdošín (Pol.: Twardoszyn) in Slovakia, on October 26 the group continued along the route through the Slovak villages of Cimova and Vilanova, until they reached Polish soil [56]. One of the retinue had procured a dung-cart, where the Marshal:
The Last Days Two days later, the Marshal returned to Warsaw, following a period of exile of more than two years. In order to avoid detection, Rydz traveled from Cracow to Poland's capital by car. The condition of Warsaw made a "very dreary impression". Bombed and burned-out houses lined the main roads and overcrowded trolleys were divided by signs indicating 'Nur für Deutsche!'. The Gestapo (German Secret State Police), freely indulged in excesses of brutality, contributing towards an atmosphere of terror [58]. Under these conditions, Rydz found temporary residence in neglected quarters on Marszalkowska Street. Moving to more suitable lodgings on November 3, the Marshal endeavored to establish contact with Col. Edward Radwan-Pfeiffer of the Z.W.Z. Of all the underground officials, Pfeiffer proved to be the most sympathetic toward the Marshal [59]. More than one participant during this period contended that Rydz intended to conform with the existing Polish authorities both - in London and Warsaw. Technically, the existence of the O.P.W. as an independent organization conflicted with the prerogatives of the Z.W.Z. and the London-based Polish government. Although Rydz intended to meet with Rowecki, Piasecki, who joined the Marshal in Warsaw, had a "different opinion". As a result, Rydz and the former O.Z.N. leader "had many disagreements". Irrespective of Piasecki's wishes, the Marshal desired his own agreement with Sikorski. A Polish agent, who had contacts with the anti-Hitler German officers, was entrusted with the task of reaching Gen. Wladyslaw Anders. Supposedly, it was the arrest of this agent that aborted this attempt. In view of the London government's rejection of service offers from pre-war regime personnel, there was no guarantee, however, that Sikorski would accept Rydz [60]. Such negative prognostications were visible during February of 1941, when Polish government officials contemplated possible reactions to reports of the Marshal's return. Sosnkowski, who at the time conducted liaison between the Sikorski regime and the Z.W.Z., communicated the sentiment that Rydz's presence might threaten the government-sponsored resistance efforts against the Germans [61]. Eight months later, little or no evidence existed to support the contention of a positive reception. Throughout this remaining period of his life, the Marshal conveyed a picture of "perfect self-control and his quiet manner gave those around him confidence". Those, who met him agreed that Rydz's "honesty, high-mindedness and straightforwardness elicited great respect and approval" [62]. On the few occasions that the Marshal showed depression, it was mainly due to the public opinion of him.
Rydz once declared,
If expressions of such depression appeared rarely, symptoms of Rydz's deteriorating physical health occurred more frequently. Medical prescriptions which were issued to the Marshal indicated treatment for a failing heart [64]. Several doctors, including Julian Piasecki's brother, attempted to reverse the process which inevitably claimed Rydz's life. The constant vigilance for German agents which impelled one last change in the Marshal's living quarters, this time to the house belonging to the widow of Gen. Wlodzimierz Maxymowicz-Raczynski, probably added to the strain of Rydz's weakening health. On November 28, Rydz began to suffer increased pain from his heart condition. Despite a combination of caffeine and morphine capsules, the marked breakdown in health continued through December 1. On this date, Dr. Jan Roguski, one of the three physicians tending the Marshal, declared that Rydz's health took a serious turn for the worse. Nonetheless, the Marshal received a number of visitors. When one of these arrivals inquired as to how the Marshal felt, Rydz responded with, "Right in the cemetery!" [65]. Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz died in the early morning hours of December 2, 1941, from an attack of angina pectoris [66]. The following day, a third physician, Dr. Edward Loth, embalmed the body as others prepared for the burial. A large group of the Marshal's subordinates arrived before the time designated for the funeral procession and despite the danger, placed two large wreaths, decorated with VIRTUTI MILITARI, or CROSS OF VALOR ribbons, on the coffin. Neither the Gestapo, nor other German agents interfered as an automobile caravan transported Rydz's body for burial to Powazki Cemetery in Warsaw. There, on December 6, the Marshal was buried under a soldier's cross, bearing the pseudonym 'ADAM ZAWISZA' [67]. Piasecki demanded that the Marshal's death be kept secret. A few days after the funeral, the former O.Z.N. leader ordered a meeting of the O.P.W. membership do discuss "some of the more serious problems" which the Marshal faced before his death, namely the establishment of contact with the Z.W.Z. Piasecki claimed to have received instructions from Rydz during their last conversations, to devote all his energies, in the event of Marshal's death, toward the unity of the 'pilsudczycy' organizations. Rydz considered above all, alleged Piasecki, that no one outside of this circle should receive word concerning the event of his death [68]. Following execution of this so-called 'testament', Piasecki continued talks begun by the Marshal with such Z.W.Z. representatives as Zygmunt Hempel, who also retained some former pro-'Sanacja' sympathies. As the self-proclaimed interpreter of of Rydz's 'testament', Piasecki undertook the fulfillment of organizational matters which had been outlined earlier by the Marshal in Hungary, and initiated in Warsaw. Here again, it becomes difficult to differentiate between Piasecki's initiative and the Marshal's will [69]. Although Rydz reportedly intended to subordinate himself to London, he desired the consolidation of the 'pisludczycy' elements in Poland. Conversely, Piasecki, who desired the O.P.W. to be independent of Z.W.Z. control and the London-based government, appeared loyal to the Marshal's requests. Nevertheless, as a result of Rydz's initiative, at the beginning of 1942 the O.P.W. established close contact with the recently-formed Konwent Organizacji Niepodleglosciowych (K.O.N. - Convent of Independence Organizations), which included the resurrected P.O.W. and Zwiazek Strzelecki. This collaboration produced, by the end of January 1942, the publication of a modest weekly Przeglad Polityczny O.P.W., along with the K.O.N.'s publication Mysli Naczelne. By the beginning of May, the O.P.W. and K.O.N. increased their circulation and managed a national distribution through such associated groups as the Zwiazek Przysposobienia Kolejowego (Railroad Training Union). Additional expansion resulted in the publication of Nurt, which printed articles by Ferdynand Goetel, the Polish writer, who gave O.Z.N. its name. Most of these publications continued "up to the first hours of the Warsaw Uprising" [70]. Rydz's final contribution regarding the O.P.W., then, figuratively reached beyond the grave. Curiosity, concerning the Marshal's fate occasionally arose, while numerous Polish organizations of varying political denominations fought for their respective conceptions of a restored homeland. Known to only a few as the Marshal's last resting place, the grave under Adam Zawisza's name in Powazki Cemetery remained physically unscathed by the devastation of the remaining four years of warfare. For the most part, the uncertainty and confusion regarding the origins of Poland's defeat, as well as the precarious nature of its future, contributed towards Rydz's relegation to a period of ignominity and obscurity in the memory of his countrymen. Epilogue: Myth and Reality The day after Rydz's death, Stalin suggested to Sikorski at their meeting in the Soviet town of Kuibyshev 'minor' alterations of Poland's frontier with the U.S.S.R. Despite Sikorski's refusal to discuss the matter, Stalin's suggestion portended further tragic consequences to befall Poland in the near future. Within four days of this meeting, the United States entered the Second World War. The Marshal's death remained a virtual secret through the ensuing years of war. When Stalin met with Gen. Anders on March 18, 1942 to discuss problems concerning Poland's reformed armies, the Soviet dictator inquired, from curiosity,
Anders replied:
This uncertainty surrounding Rydz's fate manifested itself in the divergent interpretations which continued beyond the end of the war. One version claimed that Rydz's clandestine return to Poland in 1943 resulted in his death the following year in the Warsaw Uprising. According to others, the Marshal returned to Warsaw in 1946 where he was executed. Still another story placed Rydz at the head of Jewish armies in the Middle East [72]. During July 1941, while he was still in Budapest, a Turkish periodical reported the Marshal's offer to serve in the Soviet armies, which had supposedly been conducted through the mediation of Moscow's military attaché in Ankara, but was rejected [73]. Within a year and a half of the Marshal’s death, a London periodical declared, in effect, that Rydz led Poland's underground forces. Assuming the pseudonym of 'Grzyb' (Mushroom) Rydz, according to the article which was duplicated in Polish language publications abroad, organized sabotage attacks against the occupying German forces [74]. It was not until February of 1946 that the first public revelations concerning Rydz's last days appeared in the Polish weekly Defilada (Parade), published by the Polish 1st Armoured Division in Holland and later in occupied Germany. Reproduced in other publications as well, the article emphasized Rydz's tragic return and attempted contact with Rowecki [75]. The following years witnessed a two-sided phenomenon as the post-war Polish regime permitted chrysanthemums crossed in the shape of Marshal's batons, assorted flowers, wreaths and flaming torches to adorn Rydz's grave. However, virtually all publications originating from Poland manifested anti-rehabilitation characteristics by condemning the Marshal as the promoter and continuator of pseudo-fascistic designs which had been instituted earlier by Pilsudski. Many formerly prominent personalities who supported or opposed the 'Sanacja' and who now resided in the West, blamed Poland's pre-war leadership for the catastrophe which overtook their homeland. More than one Western European historian popularly associated Rydz and other Polish leaders with the worst elements of dictatorship and cited them for gangsterism, essentially contributing to the breakdown of the European system. The few voices, such as Slawoj-Skladkowski's, which rose in Rydz's defense, were denounced as the Marshal's collaborators in sowing the seeds of Poland's destruction [76]. Many critics, who considered Rydz ill-suited to serve as commander-in-chief, failed to provide convincing alternatives in either personalities or decisions. Against the reality of Poland's virtually embryonic state of national development, the Marshal's appearance in internal politics during the years 1935-1939 appeared inevitable and became, in essence, a race against time and impossible odds. No other European nation during this period faced the myriad of pressures which beset Poland. Solutions to Poland's military, economic, political and social problems were largely interdependent upon each other. For a period of little less than a decade, the charismatic personality and authoritarian tutelage of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, rather than those government forms provided by the 1921 Constitution, held Poland together. The era of pacification and economic restoration following the Locarno Agreement gave way to the world-wide depression which became part of the inheritance of Pilsudski's successors. Neither could any one political party come to a lasting agreement with the other toward any workable solutions for Poland's titanic problems. Both ends of the nation's political spectrum worked against the concept of national unity by narrowly adhering to their own individual interpretation of their country's welfare, to the exclusion of the other. Instead of consolidating forces in the interest of the State, the eternal curse of Poland's factionalism became more pronounced. A semblance of political unity in the face of the German threat occurred too late to reverse the deterioration affecting Poland's national fabric. Even if Rydz had been fortunate enough to be one of those rare theoretical geniuses of the strategical caliber of the nineteenth-century German general, Carl von Clausewitz, or the Swiss baron, Antoine Henri de Jomini, Poland's chronic political disunity coupled with its industrial underdevelopment and insufficient armaments practically guaranteed the September 1939 defeat. In the face of a superior technological foe, Poland could do little without the activation of commitments and substantial armaments assistance from the Western Powers. The alternatives portended partition.
the Marshal responded to an interviewer, less than two months before the outbreak of hostilities,
Not even Pilsudski could have avoided Poland's inevitable defeat as the Western Powers failed to move against Germany. Perhaps, if Rydz succeeded where others had failed, in stemming the German tide, the history written by his countrymen might have treated this gifted soldier and underrated patriot in a more sympathetic manner. The tragedy of the man and nation lay in the huge amounts of hope and endeavor which were forged from the flames of independence, only to end in such complete ruin. The object of rebuke from those, who once served him, the aged and sickly Marshal devoted his remaining life energies toward the restoration of the land that he once helped to fashion. Two distinct periods of Poland's physical extinction preceded the Marshal's birth and death. A sense of tragic futility regarding Poland's uncertain destiny, which appeared to oppress others, rarely affected the Marshal. The one important element, he believed, that guaranteed the perpetuity of national existence remained the Polish people. Rydz belonged to that generation of patriots, who selflessly gave of themselves to restore and preserve their nation. As participants in Poland's resurrection, they jealously guarded their prerogatives in defining their nation's welfare, entrusting it to only a select few. Following more than a century of extinction, Poland's reappearance on the map of Europe could not bring with it the immediate maturation of a national political consciousness nor an indigenous school of military thought. During this uncertain era of experimentation, who is to say that decisions, other than those decided upon by Rydz and his collaborators, would have altered Poland's fate? The most that anyone could offer, as the Marshal so aptly stated, were "honest intentions and desires to make real efforts" [78]. The rest remained outside the realm of human capability. |
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