Comrades!
Since the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet the international situation
has shown no change for the better. On the contrary, it has become even more tense.
The steps taken by various governments to put an end to this state of tension
have obviously proved inadequate. They met with no success. This is true of Europe. Nor has
there been any change for the better in East Asia. Japanese troops continue to occupy the
principal cities and a considerable part of the territory of China. Nor is Japan refraining
from hostile acts against the U.S.S.R. Here, too, the situation has changed in the direction of
further aggravation.
In view of this state of affairs, the conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression
between the U.S.S.R. and Germany is of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger of war
between Germany and the Soviet Union. In order more fully to define the significance of this
Pact, I must first dwell on the negotiations which have taken place in recent months in
Moscow with representatives of Great Britain and France.
As you know, Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations for conclusion of a pact of
mutual assistance against aggression in Europe began as far back as April. True, the initial
proposals of the British government were, as you know, entirely unacceptable. They ignored
the prime requisites for such negotiations - they ignored the principle of reciprocity and
equality of obligations. In spite of this, the Soviet Government did not reject the
negotiations and in turn put forward its own proposals. We were mindful of the fact that it
was difficult for the governments of Great Britain and France to make an abrupt change in
their policy from an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, which had existed quite
recently to serious negotiations with the U.S.S.R. based on the condition of equality of
obligation. However, the subsequent negotiations were not justified by the results.
The Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations lasted four months. They helped to
elucidate a number of questions. At the same time they made it clear to the representatives
of Great Britain and France that the Soviet Union has to be seriously reckoned with in
international affairs. But these negotiations encountered insuperable obstacles. The trouble,
of course, did not lie in individual "formulations" or in particular clauses in the draft of
the pact. No, the trouble was much more serious.
The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance against aggression would have
been of value only if Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had arrived at agreement as
to definite military measures against the attack of an aggressor. Accordingly, for a certain
period not only political, but also military negotiations were conducted in Moscow with
representatives of the British and French armies. However, nothing came of the military
negotiations. They encountered the difficulty that Poland, which was to be jointly
guaranteed by Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R., rejected military assistance on the part
of the Soviet Union. Attempts to overcome the objections of Poland met with no success. More,
the negotiations showed that Great Britain was not anxious to overcome these objections of
Poland, but on the contrary encouraged them. It is clear that, such being the attitude of
the Polish government and its principal ally towards military assistance on the part of the
Soviet Union in the event of aggression, the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations could not bear
fruit. After this it became clear to us that the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations were
doomed to failure.
What have the negotiations with Great Britain and France shown?
The Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations have shown that the position of Great
Britain and France is marked by howling contradictions throughout.
Judge for yourselves.
On the one hand, Great Britain and France demanded that the U.S.S.R. should
give military assistance to Poland in case of aggression. The U.S.S.R., as you know, was
willing to meet this demand, provided that the U.S.S.R. itself received like assistance from
Great Britain and France. On the other hand, precisely Great Britain and France brought
Poland on the scene, who resolutely declined military assistance on the part of the U.S.S.R.
Just try under such circumstances to reach an agreement regarding mutual assistance, when
assistance on the part of the U.S.S.R. is declared beforehand to be unnecessary and intrusive.
Further, on the one hand, Great Britain and France offered to guarantee the
Soviet Union military assistance against aggression in return for like assistance on the
part of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, they hedged round their assistance with such
reservations regarding indirect aggression as could convert this assistance into a myth and
provide them with formal legal excuse to evade giving assistance and place the U.S.S.R. in a
position of isolation in the face of the aggressor. Just try to distinguish between such a
"pact of mutual assistance" and a pact of more or less camouflaged chicanery.
[lively animation in the hall]
Further, on one hand Great Britain and France stressed the importance and
gravity of negotiations for a pact of mutual assistance and demanded that the U.S.S.R. should
treat the matter most seriously and settle very rapidly all questions relating to the pact.
On the other hand, they themselves displayed extreme dilatoriness and an absolutely
light-minded attitude towards the negotiations, entrusting them to individuals of secondary
importance, who were not invested with adequate powers. It is enough to mention that the
British and French military missions came to Moscow without any definite powers and without
the right to conclude any military convention.
[animation in the hall]
More, the British military mission arrived in Moscow without any mandate at all
[general laughter],
and it was only on the demand of our military mission that on the very eve of the breakdown
of the negotiations they presented written credentials. But even these credentials were of
the vaguest kind, that is, credentials without proper weight. Just try to distinguish between
this light-minded attitude towards the negotiations on the part of Great Britain and France
and frivolous make-believe at negotiations designed to discredit the whole business of
negotiations.
Such are the intrinsic contradictions in the attitude of Great Britain and
France towards the negotiations with the U.S.S.R., which led to their breakdown.
What is the root of contradictions in the position of Great Britain and
France?
In a few words, it can be put as follows. On the one hand, the British and
French governments fear aggression, and for that reason they would like to have a pact of
mutual assistance with the Soviet Union provided it helped strengthen them, Great Britain
and France. But, on the other hand, the British and French governments are afraid that the
conclusion of a real pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. may strengthen our country,
the Soviet Union, which, it appears, does not answer their purpose. It must be admitted that
these fears of theirs outweighed other considerations. Only in this way can we understand
the position of Poland, who acts on the instructions of Great Britain and France.
I shall now pass to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.
The decision to conclude a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany
was adopted after military negotiations with France and Great Britain had reached an impasse
owing to the insuperable differences I have mentioned. As the negotiations had shown that
the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected, we could not but
explore other possibilities of ensuring peace and eliminating the danger of war between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. If the British and French governments refused to reckon with this,
that is their affair. it is our duty to think of the interests of the Soviet people, the
interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
[prolonged applause]
All the more since we are firmly convinced that the interests of the U.S.S.R. coincide with
the fundamental interests of the peoples of other countries.
[applause]
But that is only one side of the matter.
Another circumstance was required before the Soviet-German Non-Aggression
Pact could come into existence. It was necessary that in her foreign policy, Germany should
make a turn towards good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. Only, when this second
condition was fulfilled, only when it became clear to us that the German government desired
to change its foreign policy so as to secure an improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R. was
the basis found for for the conclusion of a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.
Everybody knows that during the last six years, ever since the
National-Socialists came into power, political relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. have
been strained. Everybody also knows that despite the differences of outlook and political
systems, the Soviet Government endeavoured to maintain normal business and political
relations with Germany. There is no need now to revert to individual incidents of these
relations during recent years, which are well known to you. I must, however, recall the
explanation of our foreign policy given several months ago at the Eighteenth Party
Congress.
Speaking of our tasks in the realm of foreign policy, Comrade Stalin
defined our attitude to other countries as follows:
1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business
relations with all countries;
2. To be cautious and not to allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers,
who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. [animation in the hall]
As you see, Comrade Stalin declared in conclusion that the Soviet Union
stands for strengthening business relations with all countries. But at the same time Comrade
Stalin warned us against warmongers, who are anxious in their own interests to involve our
country in conflicts with other countries. Exposing the hullabaloo, raised in the British,
French, and American press about Germany's "plans" for the seizure of the Ukraine, Comrade
Stalin said:
... It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to
incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a
conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.
As you see, Comrade Stalin hit the nail on the head, when he exposed the
machinations of the West-European politicians, who were trying to set Germany and the
Soviet Union at loggerheads.
It must be confessed that there were some short-sighted people even in our
own country who, carried away by oversimplified anti-fascist propaganda, forgot about this
provocative work of our enemies. Mindful of this, Comrade Stalin even then suggested the
possibility of other, unhostile, good-neighbourly relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R.
It can now be seen that on the whole, Germany correctly understood these
statements of Comrade Stalin and drew practical conclusions from them.
The conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact shows that Comrade
Stalin's historic prevision has been brilliantly confirmed.
[stormy ovation in honour of Comrade Stalin]
In the spring of this year, the German government made a proposal to resume
commercial and credit negotiations. Soon after, the negotiations were resumed. By making
mutual concessions, we succeeded in reaching an agreement. As you know, this agreement was
signed on August 19.
This is not the first commercial and credit agreement concluded with Germany
under her present Government. But this agreement differs favourably not only from the 1935
agreement, but from all previous agreements, not to mention the fact that we had no economic
agreement equally advantageous with Great Britain, France or any other country. The agreement
is advantageous to us because its credit conditions (a seven-year credit) enables us to order
a considerable additional quantity of such equipment as we need. By this agreement, the U.S.S.R.
undertakes to sell to Germany a definite quantity of our surplus raw materials for her
industry, which fully answers the interests of the U.S.S.R. Why should we reject such an
advantageous economic agreement? Surely not to please those, who are generally averse to the
Soviet Union having advantageous economic agreements with other countries. And it is clear
that the commercial and credit agreement with Germany is fully in accord with the economic
interests and defence needs of the Soviet Union. This agreement is fully in accord with the
decision of the Eighteenth Congress of our Party, which approved Comrade Stalin's statement
as to the need for "strengthening business relations with all countries".
When, however, the German government expressed the desire to improve political
relations as well, the Soviet Government had no grounds for refusing. This gave rise to the
question of concluding a non-aggression pact.
Voices are now being heard testifying to the lack of understanding of the most
simple reasons for the improvement of political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany,
which has begun. For example, people ask with an air of innocence, how the Soviet Union could
consent to improve political relations with a state of a fascist type. "Is that possible?" they ask. But they forget that this is not a question of our attitude towards the internal
regime of another country, but of the foreign relations between the two states. They forget
that we hold the position of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and,
correspondingly, of not tolerating interference in our own internal affairs. Furthermore,
they forget the important principle of our foreign policy, which was formulated by Comrade
Stalin at the Eighteenth Party Congress as follows:
... We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with
all countries. That is our position, and we adhere to that position as long as those
countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no
attempts to trespass on the interests of our country.
The meaning of these words is quite clear: the Soviet Union strives to
maintain friendly relations with all non-Soviet countries, provided that these countries
maintain a like attitude towards the Soviet Union.
In our foreign policy towards non-Soviet countries, we have always been guided
by Lenin's well-known principle of the peaceful co-existence of the Soviet state and the
capitalist countries. A large number of examples might be cited to show how this principle
has been carried out in practice. But I will confine myself to only a few. We have, for
instance, a non-aggression and neutrality treaty with fascist Italy ever since 1933. It has
never occurred to anybody as yet to object to this treaty. And this is natural. Inasmuch as
this pact meets the interests of the U.S.S.R., it is in accord with our principle of the peaceful
co-existence of the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries. We have non-aggression pacts with Poland
and certain other countries, whose semi-fascist system is known to all. These pacts have not
given rise to any misgivings either. Perhaps it would not be superfluous to mention the fact
that we have not even treaties of this kind with certain other non-fascist bourgeois-democratic
countries, with Great Britain herself, for instance. But that is not our fault.
Since 1926, the political basis of our relations with Germany has been the
treaty of neutrality which was already extended by the present German government in 1933.
This treaty of neutrality remains in force to this day. The Soviet Government considered
it desirable even before this to take a further step towards improving political relations
with Germany, but the circumstances have been such that this has become possible only now.
It is true that it is not a pact of mutual assistance that is in question,
as in the case of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, but only of a non-aggression pact.
Nevertheless, conditions being what they are, it is difficult to overestimate the
international importance of the Soviet-German Pact. That is why we favoured the visit of
von Ribbentrop, the German minister for foreign affairs, in Moscow.
August 23, 1939, the day the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed,
is to be regarded as a date of great historical importance. The Non-Aggression Pact between
the U.S.S.R. and Germany marks a turning point in the history of Europe, and not only of Europe.
Only yesterday the German fascists were pursuing a foreign policy hostile
to us. Yes, only yesterday we were enemies in the sphere od foreign relations. Today,
however, the situation has changed and we are enemies no longer. The art of politics in the
sphere of foreign relations does not consist in increasing the number of enemies for one's
country. On the contrary, the art of politics in this sphere is to reduce the number of
such enemies and to make the enemies of yesterday good neighbours, maintaining peaceable
relations with one another.
[applause]
History has shown that enmity and wars between our country and Germany have
been to the detriment of our countries, not to their benefit. Russia and Germany suffered
most of all countries in the war of 1914-1918.
[voice: True!]
Therefore the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany stand in need of
peaceable relations. The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact puts an end to enmity between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. and this is in the interests of both countries. The fact that our
outlooks and political systems differ must not and cannot be obstacles to the establishment
of good political relations between both states, just as like differences are not
impediments to good political relations which the U.S.S.R. maintains with other non-Soviet
capitalist countries. Only enemies of Germany and the U.S.S.R. can strive to create and foment
enmity between the peoples of these countries. We have always stood for amity between the
peoples of the U.S.S.R. and Germany, for the growth and development od friendship between the
peoples of the Soviet Union and the German people.
[stormy, prolonged applause]
The importance of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact lies in the fact
that the two largest states in Europe have agreed to put an end to the enmity between them,
to eliminate the menace of war and live at peace one with the other, narrowing thereby the
zone of possible military conflicts in Europe. Even, if military conflicts in Europe should
prove unavoidable, the scope of hostilities will now be restricted. Only the instigators of
a general European war can be displeased by the state of affairs, those who under the mask
of pacifism would like to ignite a general conflagration in Europe.
The Soviet-German Pact has been the object of numerous attacks in the
English, French and American press. Conspicuous in these efforts are certain "socialist"
newspapers, diligent servitors of "their" national capitalism, servitors of gentlemen, who
pay them decently.
[laughter in the hall]
It is clear that the real truth cannot be expected from gentry of this calibre.
Attempts are being made to spread the fiction that the signing of the
Soviet-German Pact disrupted the negotiations with England and France on a mutual
assistance pact. This lie has already been nailed in the interview given by Comrade
Voroshilov. In reality, as you know, the very reverse is true. The Soviet Union signed
the non-aggression pact with Germany, for one thing, in view of the fact that the
negotiations with France and England had run into insuperable differences and ended in
failure through the fault of the ruling classes of England and France.
Further, they go so far as to blame us because the Pact, if you please,
contains no clause providing for its denunciation in case one of the signatories is drawn
into war under conditions which might give someone an external pretext to qualify this
particular country as an aggressor. But they forget for some reason that such a clause and
such a reservation is not to be found either in the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact
signed in 1934 and annulled by Germany in 1939 against the wishes of Poland, or in the
Anglo-German declaration on non-aggression signed only a few months ago. The question
arises: why cannot the U.S.S.R. allow itself the same privilege as Poland and England
allowed themselves long ago?
Finally, there are wiseacres who construe from the Pact more than is
written in it.
[laughter]
For this purpose, all kinds of conjectures and hints are mooted in order to cast doubt on
the Pact in one or another country. But all this merely speaks for the hopeless impotence
ot the enemies of the Pact, who are exposing themselves more and more as enemies of both
the Soviet Union and Germany, striving to provoke war between these countries.
In all this, we find fresh corroboration of Comrade Stalin's warning that
we must be particularly cautious with warmongers, who are accustomed to have others pull
the chestnuts out of the fire for them. We must be on guard against those, who see an
advantage to themselves in bad relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, in enmity
between them, and who do not want peace and good-neighbourly relations between Germany and
the Soviet Union.
We can understand, why this policy is being pursued by out-and-out
imperialists. But we cannot ignore such facts as the especial zeal with which some
leaders of the Socialist Parties of Great Britain and France have recently distinguished
themselves in this matter. And these gentlemen have really gone the whole hog, and no
mistake.
[laughter]
These people positively demand that the U.S.S.R. get itself involved in war against
Germany on the side of Great Britain. Have not these rabid warmongers taken leave of their
senses?
[laughter]
Is it really difficult for these gentlemen to understand the purpose of the Soviet-German
Non-Aggression Pact, on the strength of which the U.S.S.R. is not obliged to involve
itself in war either on the side of Great Britain against Germany or on the side of
Germany against Great Britain? Is it really difficult to understand that the U.S.S.R. is
pursuing and will continue to pursue its own independent policy, based on the interests of
the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and only their interests?
[prolonged applause]
If these gentlemen have such an uncontrollable desire to fight, let them do their own
fighting, without the Soviet Union.
[laughter, applause]
We would see what fighting stuff they are made of.
[laughter, applause]
In our eyes, in the eyes of the entire Soviet people, these are just as
much enemies of peace as all other instigators of war in Europe. Only those, who desire a
grand new slaughter, a new holocaust of nations, only they want to set the Soviet Union
and Germany at loggerheads, they are the only people, who want to destroy the incipient
restoration of good-neighbourly relations between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and Germany.
The Soviet Union signed a pact with Germany, fully assured that peace
between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and Germany is in the interests of all peoples, in the
interests of universal peace. Every sincere supporter of peace will realize the truth of
this.
This Pact corresponds to the fundamental interests of the working people
of the Soviet Union and cannot weaken our vigilance in defence of these interests. This
Pact is backed by firm confidence in our real forces, in their complete preparedness to
meet any aggression against the U.S.S.R.
[stormy applause]
This Pact, like the unsuccessful Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations,
proves that no important questions of international relations - and questions of Eastern
Europe even less - can be settled without the active participation of the Soviet Union,
that any attempts to shut out the Soviet Union and decide such questions behind its back
are doomed to failure.
[applause]
The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact spells a new turn in the development
of Europe, a turn towards improvement od relations between the two largest states of
Europe. This Pact not only eliminates the menace of war with Germany, narrows down the
zone od possible hostilities in Europe, and serves thereby the cause of universal peace
- it must open to us new possibilities of increasing our strength, of further
consolidation of our position, of further growth of the influence of the Soviet Union on
international developments.
There is no need to dwell here on the separate clauses of the Pact. The
Council of People's Commissars has reason to hope that the Pact will meet with your
approval as a document of cardinal importance to the U.S.S.R.
[applause]
The Council of People's Commissars submits the Soviet-German Non-Aggression
Pact to the Supreme Soviet and proposes that it be ratified.
[stormy, prolonged applause - all rise]
• • •
On the conclusion of Comrade Molotov's statement, the joint sitting of
the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.,
on a motion of Deputy Shcherbakov, unanimously adopted the following resolution:
Having heard the statement of Comrade V.M. Molotov, the Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on the
ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, the Supreme Soviet of
the U.S.S.R. resolves:
1. To approve the foreign policy of the Government.
2. To ratify the Non-Aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, concluded in Moscow,
August 23, 1939.
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. M. KALININ.
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. A. GORKIN.
Moscow. The Kremlin. August 31, 1939
(Soviet official English language version)
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